Middle East Terrorism

In general, terrorism by non-state actors arises from those who are too weak to engage in more conventional forms of armed struggle or are motivated by the sheer frustration of their situation. Some individuals who enlist with radical Islamist groups may also be promoted in part by the perceived glory of martyrdom. Supporters of such terrorism justify such actions as a means of inflicting damage on political entities and societies as a whole that are seen as carrying out mass violence through government forces too strong to confront directly.

For example, Israel's occupation and colonization of Palestinian territory seized in the Six-Day War in 1967, the ongoing repression, and rejection of demands for a full withdrawal in return for security guarantees—combined with Israel's overwhelming military power and the large-scale military, financial, and diplomatic support from the world's only remaining superpower—have led some Palestinians to support suicide bombing as a means of convincing Israel that the costs of holding on to the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip are higher than withdrawal. Such violence has actually hardened the attitudes of Israelis and their American backers, as it appears to reinforce their assumption that the Palestinians' actual goal is not just ending the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but the destruction of Israel itself.

The terrorism of previous decades in the Middle East, like terrorism practiced by leftist and nationalist movements elsewhere, was based upon the idea of "propaganda of the deed"—inspiring popular struggle and demoralizing their opponents. In this regard, it was almost uniformly unsuccessful, particularly as enhanced security measures made successful terrorist operations more difficult.

Suicide bombing not only was easier to carry out, since the terrorists were willing to kill themselves in the process, but Islamist groups were able—despite Islamic prohibitions against suicide and killing innocent people—to take advantage of the exalted role of martyrdom among Muslims to gain recruits and popular support. Such terrorist operations, with their potential for inflicting enormous casualties, appear to also be designed to provoke a disproportionate reaction from governments with superior armed forces, resulting in large-scale civilian casualties and thereby increasing support for their extreme anti-Western ideology. A number of strategic analysts have argued that the U.S. response to September 11, particularly the invasion of Iraq, have actually strengthened Al Qaeda by leading increasing numbers of alienated young Muslims to adopt bin Laden's view of a holy war between Islam and the West.

Some groups, such as Al Qaeda, function primarily to promote their causes through terrorism. Others, like Hamas, carry out civilian functions—such as running health clinics and schools and providing social services—as well as supporting an armed wing involved in terrorism. Some have evolved into political parties: for example, since the mid-1990s, Hizbollah has refrained from attacks against civilians, has largely restricted its armed activities to Israeli occupation forces, and has competed in Lebanese parliamentary elections.

Most contemporary Middle Eastern terrorist groups have emerged out of situations where there has been widespread social dislocation through war or uneven economic development. Virtually all have emerged in situations where legal nonviolent means of political change have been suppressed. The disproportionate level of terrorism in the Middle East appears to be less a result of anything inherent within Arab culture or within Islam than a consequence of the systematic denial by governments to allow for the manifestation of basic rights, including the right of self-determination. Given that the primary supporters and arms providers of most of these repressive Middle Eastern governments are Western powers such as the United States, the threat from terrorism is unlikely to be suppressed through military means alone.