State of Nature

By the end of the eighteenth century, the social contract was widely criticized on historical grounds. The idea fell into general disuse, and with it, the state of nature. Contract theory was revived by John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice (1971), although Rawls used his contract to justify moral principles rather than a form of government. Rawls's principles of justice are those that would be agreed upon under appropriately fair conditions. The state of nature reappears in his theory as the "original position." In order to prevent people from choosing principles that would advantage themselves, they are placed behind a "veil of ignorance" and so deprived of knowledge of their personal attributes, e.g., age, religion, race, and wealth. The two principles selected under these conditions are highly egalitarian, guaranteeing equal liberty and that economic inequalities benefit the least-advantaged members of society. With Rawls, the state of nature (original position) loses all historical pretense. It is simply an analytical device to help identify appropriate moral principles.

Other theorists employ contractual devices to justify moral principles rather than government. In David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement, appropriate principles are those that would be agreed upon by parties motivated by self-interest. Gauthier's "initial bargaining position" differs from Rawls's original position in that the parties have full knowledge of their circumstances and interests. The principles agreed upon represent the parties' least possible concession to others' demands, the "maximum relative concession."

A different, highly influential alternative to Rawls's contract theory is Robert Nozick's "invisible hand" explanation of the origin of the state, in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. According to Nozick, individuals situated in a Lockean state of nature join together in "mutual protective associations," which are then moved by market forces to combine in ever-larger associations, eventually giving rise to an "ultraminimal state," and finally a minimal state. Nozick argues that a state can arise through such a process without violating anyone's rights, and that only a minimal state can meet this condition.