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Practices - Pierre Bourdieu And Anthony Giddens

social structure actors actions

The central problem in the work of the French sociologist/anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu and the British sociologist Anthony Giddens is the relationship between agency (the capacity of human subjects to engage in social action) and social structure. Both see social structure as including both patterns of distribution of material resources and systems of classification and meaning. In their works, social structure encompasses both the Marxian/Durkheimian and Lévi-Straussian senses of the phrase. Both share the insight that the social structure as such has no reality apart from its instantiation through the practices (Bourdieu) or actions (Giddens) of particular human beings. Those actions, in aggregate, create and reproduce the structure in which the actions are embedded.

The two theorists diverge, however, in their assessment of the importance of conscious intention in the reproduction of the social structure. Bourdieu labels the key concept for understanding the relationship between action and structure habitus (following Marcel Mauss [1872–1950]). The habitus consists of "systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures" (1977, p. 72). Quotidian practices—of work and leisure, of the design and use of space—communicate basic assumptions about such social categories as gender, age, and social hierarchy. Through practice, actors are socialized to particular embodied dispositions (their habitus). Like Raymond Williams's (1921–1988) "structures of feeling," the habitus does not determine particular actions, but orients actors to particular goals and strategies. Acting on their (socially determined) intentions, the improvised and contingent practices of social actors thus tend to reproduce the symbolic and material orderings of the social world. Since key aspects of the social order are naturalized through the discipline of the body, they are (or appear to be) beyond the social order itself, indeed becoming part of the taken-for-granted, "natural" order (in Bourdieu's system, doxa). Practices thus tend, regardless of the actor's intentions, to reinforce the claims of the powerful.

Although he prefers the term action to practice in his own work, Anthony Giddens is usually considered in discussions of practice theory. The key term in Gidden's work is structuration. Like Bourdieu, Giddens views social structure as encompassing both material and symbolic dimensions. Social structure, according to Giddens, is the product of action, "a stream of actual or contemplated causal interventions of corporeal beings in the ongoing process of events-in-the-world" (1979, p. 55). Agents (actors with the capacity to act and, moreover, the capacity to have acted differently in any given situation), thus, create structure. However, their agency is only meaningful insofar as they are constructed as subjects (in particular subject positions) in a given social structure. Structuration describes the essentially recursive quality of social process: the agent is produced by the structure, which is, in reality, no more than the objectification of past actions by agents.

The main difference between the accounts of Bourdieu and Giddens lies in the relative significance that each gives to the conscious intentions of social actors. For Giddens, actors are reflexive; they have the capacity to reflect on their actions and their identities, and to act according to their intentions. The reflexivity of actors is, indeed, an aspect of social action, and, thus, part of structuration. In the work of Bourdieu, conscious reflection on one's habitus is a possibility, but not a usual part of social process. For Giddens, in contrast, reflexivity is an essential and potentially transformative element of social process.

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10 months ago

Practices - Pierre Bourdieu And Anthony Giddens

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about 1 year ago

hello

thank you for your Article

I use from this for my Thesis

but Aouther of that isn't reveal

and I can't give reference

would you say me Aouther of this, please?

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almost 2 years ago

Interesting summary of two very complex theories. However this summary and opposition of Bourdieu and Giddens in terms of agency, structure, structuration and habitus is not entirely satisfying and even dangerously wrong.

Bourdieu has written a field theory to describe human practices and within this field theory he uses the notions of field; social, economic, cultural and symbolic capital; and habitus. Those concepts have to be taken together when using Bourdieu's conceptual framework. Habitus is meaningless without the notions of capitals and field. In a same way the (mis)use of social capital by many without the notions of other forms of capital, field and habitus is theoretically wrong. Saying that an actor in Bourdieu's perspective is entering 'a game' (field) and 'knows the rules of a game' (habitus) and can play the game depending the 'buttons or resources' (capitals) he has. The player can chose to play the game by the rules or try to oppose the rules using the capitals. He is thus a reflexive being in all actions he takes.

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almost 3 years ago

Very much appreciating the author gives an understandable and compact introduction which is quite an achievement referring to complexity of two theoretical approaches I do not agree with some of the implications of the last paragraph.

The description of reflexivity at least gives the notion that it is similar to a “conscious reflection” (in the sense of “cogito”). That this is not the case is exactly the point both authors stress. Even when the authors speak of the intentionality of practice this does not imply a conscious reflection but rather a practical intentionality that lies in the “game” of practice itself. Insofar I can agree that a difference between the authors lies in the attention (!) that Giddens gives to the consciousness of practice but the differences by far more show the complementarily of the approaches. So to say that in an “supplementary logic” the (prä-)reflexive accomplishments of habitus are the condition of the possibility what Giddens describes with his heuristic of “practical consciousness”.