Authoritarianism - Latin America - Caudillos

During the nineteenth century, authoritarian political structures were expressed in the form of caudillo styles of leadership. A lack of a functioning democratic system that allowed for peaceful transfers of power from one civilian government to another led to a series of palace coups and military governments. Facing a power vacuum after the disappearance of patriarchal monarchies at independence, leaders sought legitimacy through charisma and appeals to tradition rather than expressing a coherent ideology. A caudillo, which broadly means a "strongman," style of government represents the use of charisma rather than military force to keep political forces under control through promotion of allegiance to a central leader. These caudillos were not necessarily of a specific ideological orientation, could be associated with liberal or conservative politicians, and could take a military or civilian form; in addition, they might be rooted in either urban or rural populations and be oriented toward either modernizing or traditional forces. Perhaps the most common unifying thread among caudillos was their appeal to nationalism. Caudillos sometimes relied on legal means, including elections and plebiscites, to legitimate their control but once in office tolerated no dissent to their authority. Representative of this in Mexico are both Benito Juárez (r. 1861–1872) and Porfirio Díaz (r. 1877–1880; 1884–1911) who came into power claiming to support freely contested elections but then became deeply entrenched in power. Both caudillos were liberals from the poor and largely indigenous southern state of Oaxaca. They relied on this home base of support to maintain themselves in power even as their policies increasingly served elite interests. Juárez is commonly regarded as Mexico's first "Indian" president though he implemented legislation that took land away from rural villages. Díaz ruled using the strategy of pan o palo (carrot or the stick) to reward lavishly his supporters and repress brutally his opponents. It took the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920) to remove Díaz from power after thirty-four years, one of the longest-running dictatorships in the history of Latin America.

One of the most noted and resilient examples of Latin American authoritarian regimes is that of General Antonio López de Santa Anna (1794–1876) during the first half century after Mexico's independence in 1821. Santa Anna held power eleven different times with catastrophic results perhaps unequaled in Latin America's history, including the loss of half of Mexico's territory to the United States. Seemingly contradictory ideological principles, including adhering to federalism, centralism, liberalism, conservatism, and even monarchism, characterized his different times in office. When liberals held the upper hand, he ruled Mexico as a liberal. Later Santa Anna became a conservative and passed some of the most reactionary legislation in Mexico's history. Historians often point to his charisma and political opportunism as explaining his success in holding onto (or, more accurately, repeatedly returning to) power. Will Fowler, however, finds such interpretations to be unsatisfactorily simplistic in explaining Santa Anna's resilience. Rather, his success is a result of elite support, motivated by the desire to preserve hegemonic class interests. Santa Anna's promises to deliver political stability and prevent social dissolution were more important than differences in ideology. A subsequent long tradition of casting the ruler as a villain is what has made it "difficult to understand why he was so successful" (Fowler, p. 13). Santa Anna perhaps was no worse or no more opportunistic a leader than his contemporaries, just perhaps more successful in riding out political changes. In Fowler's assessment, his commitment to elite privilege and detachment from partisan politics ultimately made him an arbitrator of competing ideological interests. Whichever group currently held the upper hand courted his support in order to consolidate its control over the country.

Caudillos were not necessarily a negative force and have sometimes been divided into the categories of "cultured caudillos" and "barbarous caudillos" (Hamill, p. 5). Mariano Malgarejo from Bolivia is often considered to be a classic representation of the later. He abrogated land titles of Indian peasants and sold off large slices of Bolivian territory as if it were Tanks in Santiago during the Chilean coup. In 1973 Chilean military forces overthrew the democratic government of President Salvador Allende, supplanting it with a dictatorship that widely repressed basic human rights and banned any political opposition. © HORACIO VILLALOBOS/CORBIS his own personal property in order to generate funds to put down chronic revolts against his government. As a result, Bolivia lost to neighboring countries half of its territory as well as its outlet to the sea. Like Santa Anna, Malgarejo was perhaps no worse than any other caudillo but just more active and successful at this style of government.