Authoritarianism

While (revised) modernization theorists focused on the transitory nature of authoritarianism, there were other theorists who were interested in the internal logic and staying power of authoritarianism in East Asia. Focused on the question of legitimacy, these approaches typically developed in dialogue with Max Weber's (1864–1920) theory of the three modes of legitimacy (traditional, charismatic, legal-rational). We will review Karl Wittfogel's (1896–1988) exploration of bureaucratic centralization (legal-rational legitimacy) and Lucian and Mary Pye's investigation of Asian culture (traditional legitimacy) before considering how recent theoretical developments such as hegemony theory may contribute to the further understanding of authoritarianism in East Asia.

Wittfogel's Oriental Despotism argues that water control and distribution (especially the management of extensive system of canals) spawned hydraulic civilizations with authoritarian centralized empires and sprawling bureaucracies both deeply hostile to change. Critiques of this thesis range from observations that irrigation is often organized locally rather than by centralized bureaucracies to highlights of counterevidence from the West such as the rise and fall of ancient Greece and the chronic backwardness of eastern Europe.

Resonating with other studies of the cultural-psychological studies of authoritarianism (such as studies of fascism in Germany), the Pyes' study of cultural psychology focused on values of frugality, hard work, family values, respect for authority, and Asians' understanding of power. Critiquing the imposition of Western notions of power in understanding Asian societies, they argued that power should not be understood as "participation in the making of significant decisions" or in terms of choice but as status and, indeed, the freedom from having to decide at all. To the Pyes, this Asian sense of power generates authoritarian regimes: "When power implies the security of status, there can be no political process. Contention and strife cease" (p. 22). Insofar as power derives from morality, any challenge to the system or democratic competition is necessarily an affront to the leader and is thus responded to with a heavy hand.

This thesis has been criticized for its culturalism (using culture as an explanation rather than as something to be explained), which in this case generates the tautological thesis that "authoritarian cultures produce authoritarianism." Exactly what is Asian or Confucian culture, and is culture destiny? While the Pyes focused on hierarchical features, others rediscover alternative trajectories to argue that Asian cultures have democratic roots. For instance, William Theodore de Bary and Wei-ming Tu demonstrate the affinities between Confucianism and liberalism while Chu and Winberg Chai argue that current authoritarian regimes distort Confucian values and that if implemented correctly, Confucianism would produce democracy. Furthermore, even if there is agreement on the nature of Asia's values and historical roots, its future—what to preserve and what to change—remains something hotly debated by East Asian leaders (e.g., Singapore's Lee Kwan-Yew versus South Korea's Kim Dae-Jung).

Whatever the mode of legitimacy—legal-rational, charismatic, or traditional—contemporary theorists are increasingly acknowledging that authoritarianism can be legitimate(d) and that the distinction between democracy and authoritarianism is more blurred than modernization theories suggest. Given the problems with modernization theories, the question of why authoritarianism in East Asia is sometimes seen as legitimate by its subjects and the question of why it endures despite development need to be broached from the perspective of legitimacy rather than in terms of modernization. Because legitimacy is a subjective concept pegged to the perceptions of the ruled, the question of why authoritarian regimes (especially prosperous ones) endure is necessarily a question of ideology and research in this direction necessitates close examination of cultural and historical conditions within a regime rather than the broad socioeconomic comparisons associated with modernization theory.

One useful perspective comes from cultural studies, especially the concepts of hegemony and popular authoritarianism. Instead of the dichotomy of democratic/authoritarian, Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) postulated the categories of consent/coercion—the latter categories do not correspond with the former because they are not mutually exclusive. Following Weber's definition of the state as an organ with a legitimate monopoly over coercion, Gramsci distinguished between this "outer ditch" of coercion and an "inner ditch" of consensus and commonsense. To the extent that there is consensus, it becomes unnecessary to mobilize repressive state apparatuses to discipline society; political alternatives are sufficiently de-legitimized through the molding of commonsense. Since the 1990s, some applications of this theory to Asia have included John Girling's analysis of middle-class hegemony in Thailand, John Hilley's analysis of Mahathirism in Malaysia, and Soek-Fang Sim's analysis of the Asian Values project in Singapore.

The various theories outlined here can combine to offer a sophisticated understanding of authoritarianism in East Asia. Modernization theory, although flawed, offers effective descriptions of the democratization pressures confronted by rapidly developing countries. What it fails to do, and what is advantageous about localized theories, is the focus on how history, geography, culture, and ideology can come together to engender countervailing forces that stabilize the regime and arrest the drift toward democracy.