Subjectivism

The moral or ethical realm is extremely complex. Our moral lives involve practices, principles, convictions, commitments, duties, ideals, and more, and one can be a subjectivist about some of these without being a subjectivist about others.

Many versions of moral subjectivism are motivated by a combination of two views. In the first, different cultures, societies, subcultures, and the like often have strikingly different conceptions of morality; thus, many cultures have practiced human sacrifice, infanticide, and slavery. In the second, we are indelibly shaped by the culture and historical period in which we live; we cannot step outside our modes of evaluation and thought to some neutral Archimedean point from which we can impartially adjudicate the conflicting claims of alternative moral codes. Indeed, many subjectivists go one step further, urging that the notion that there is one true story about morality is empty.

Our moral beliefs and claims exhibit several fundamental features that any viable position in metaethics must either explain or explain away. First, ethical discourse often appears to describe, quite literally, facts in the moral realm. The theory that endorses the claim to objectivity is known as cognitivism; moral judgments make cognitive or descriptive claims, rather than simply expressing emotions or making recommendations. Second, when we give arguments that something is right or wrong, we often marshal reasons for thinking certain moral claims to be true or false. Third, moral judgments often provide motivation to act in accordance with them. Fourth, morality is a social institution that involves shared practices and beliefs.